Rainforests and coastal ecosystems provide a vital global climate service by absorbing and storing large amounts of carbon dioxide. Brazil has begun promoting this idea through the Paris Agreement’s Article 6 framework.The principle is simple: when forests deliver measurable climate benefits, those benefits must be formally recognised and paid for.
Brazil’s Forest Carbon Proposal
Brazil’s recent proposals under Article 6 reflect this approach. Its proposal treats forest protection as a nationally owned climate contribution that can be measured and transferred between countries. Under this model, forest carbon is treated as a national asset. Crucially, this approach does not require consistent demand for forest carbon credits – other countries may choose to buy these credits to support their climate targets, but there is no obligation on anyone to buy, no guaranteed income and therefore little likelihood of good long term outcomes. As a result, demand is uneven and revenues for forest countries remain unpredictable.
These limitations are decisive: long-term forest protection depends on stable incentives and predictable funding. When funding depends on voluntary purchases, forest countries struggle to plan long-term conservation, especially when carbon prices rise and fall. For example, when buyers delay purchases or prioritise cheaper domestic options, price volatility follows and long-term conservation planning breaks down. Article 6 enables cooperation, but it cannot on its own deliver the scale or consistency of demand required to protect forests.
Article 6 has developed into a structured international carbon crediting system, called the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism but this framework governs how credits are created and transferred, it doesn’t determine the level or stability of demand, which remains shaped by voluntary participation and policy choices by buyer countries.
The carbon accounts framework proposed by EcoCore restructures how forest emission reduction is valued by anchoring it directly to economy-wide carbon budgets. As carbon budgets contract, the need for climate contribution becomes structural rather than optional. Forest and blue carbon removals are therefore less dependent on voluntary uptake and more closely linked to the need for countries to remain within their carbon budgets.
Our carbon accounts framework builds on Article 6 by shifting from symbolic recognition of forest carbon to more predictable and scalable results. Under the carbon accounts framework, forest and blue carbon accumulation would be remunerated with the allocation of carbon tokens from a global carbon budget. This contrasts with the status quo where demand for climate stabilisation remains policy contingent. For example, Indonesia has taken part in the UNFCCC international framework, REDD+, and results based forest carbon schemes for over a decade.
However, revenues from forest carbon have been irregular and lower than expected and it hasn’t delivered the stable, long-term incentives needed to support conservation at scale. By tying payments for forest and blue carbon directly to carbon budgets, the carbon accounts framework replaces uncertainty with durable, system-wide incentives for forest protection.
